Critical natural resources: the new geography of risk

Introduction

The METRICS congress takes place against a backdrop of rising tensions over strategic natural resources. Copper, lithium, cobalt, graphite and rare earths have become essential to digital technology, artificial intelligence, the energy transition and defence industries. Yet their extraction and processing remain concentrated in a limited number of countries, exposing economies to supply disruptions, price volatility and geopolitical pressure.

In this context, the METRICS congress invites us to examine a major contradiction of our time. Technologies presented as tools for a more sustainable future rely on growing consumption of raw materials, whose exploitation can cause pollution, social tensions and damage to biodiversity. The question is therefore no longer simply how to guarantee access to resources. It is also how to build value chains that are more diversified, more transparent and fairer to producing regions.

The energy transition, the digital revolution and the development of artificial intelligence rest on a very material reality. Behind data centres, batteries, satellites, power grids and defence equipment lie copper, lithium, cobalt, graphite and rare earths. These resources have become essential, but their exploitation and concentration are creating new economic, geopolitical, social and environmental risks. A raw material does not become critical solely because it is scarce in nature. It becomes critical when its industrial importance is high, its production is concentrated and substitution remains difficult. The real issue is therefore not simply the presence of minerals underground. It also concerns their refining, processing, transport and incorporation into industrial products.

Concentration that weakens economies

Mineral value chains are highly concentrated. According to the latest data, the leading refining countries accounted for more than three quarters of the growth in refined supply between 2023 and 2025. China dominates the processing of many minerals, while Indonesia holds a major position in nickel. In rare earth refining, the leading global supplier’s share fell from over 90% in 2023 to around 85% in 2025. This slight decline does not remove a still considerable dependency. International Energy Agency, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/executive-summary This concentration turns a commercial problem into a strategic risk. An export restriction, a diplomatic crisis, a natural disaster or an industrial incident can slow several sectors at once. Carmakers, electronic component manufacturers and defence industries may then face shortages, delays and sharply rising costs. Geological data confirm this dependency. In 2025, China was the leading producer of twenty of the sixty minerals considered critical by the United States. The Democratic Republic of the Congo still accounted for around 75% of global cobalt production in 2024. United States Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026https://www.usgs.gov/publications/mineral-commodity-summaries-2026

Rare earths: industrial power above all

Rare earths comprise seventeen elements with distinctive properties. Some are used in permanent magnets fitted to electric motors, wind turbines, medical devices, guidance systems and many electronic products. Their name can be misleading. Several rare earths are relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust. The difficulty lies in finding economically viable concentrations and then separating elements with very similar chemical properties. This requires complex facilities, substantial expertise, significant capital and rigorous waste management. Power therefore belongs less to the country that possesses the rock than to the one that controls processing. A mine can be opened in a few years, but creating a complete industry requires refineries, specialised chemistry, energy infrastructure, engineers, industrial customers and lasting financial visibility.

A geopolitical risk that has become tangible

Critical minerals are now instruments of power. Export controls can serve as a response to technology sanctions or trade tensions. A dominant country can delay certain licences, limit export volumes or impose new administrative conditions. The danger is not confined to a complete interruption. Persistent uncertainty alone can disrupt investment, prices and inventories. Companies may be forced to build costly reserves or urgently seek less competitive suppliers. This situation also creates a risk of fragmentation in the global market. Major powers seek to secure supplies reserved for their partners. Trade agreements, public support and mining investments thus become instruments of foreign policy.

The environmental cost of mineral security

Diversifying supplies must not mean multiplying projects without assessing their consequences. Mining can lead to high water consumption, soil degradation, habitat destruction and waste containing toxic substances. Refining can also require large quantities of energy and chemicals. Across all resources, material extraction and processing account for more than 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions and around 40% of particulate-related health impacts. Without profound changes in production and consumption patterns, global resource extraction could grow by almost 60% between 2020 and 2060. United Nations Environment Programme, Global Resources Outlook 2024https://www.unep.org/index.php/resources/Global-Resource-Outlook-2024 The ecological transition thus involves a paradox. It requires more of certain minerals to reduce the use of fossil fuels, yet their extraction can itself worsen pollution, pressure on water and biodiversity loss. A coherent policy must therefore take account of materials’ entire life cycle.

Major human and social risks

Mineral supply chains can be associated with dangerous work, population displacement, corruption, the financing of armed groups and human rights abuses. These risks arise particularly where institutions are fragile, artisanal mining is poorly regulated or traceability remains insufficient. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development recommends that companies identify the origin of minerals, assess their suppliers, prevent serious abuses and report on the measures they adopt. This due diligence must cover the entire chain, from mine to final product. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Responsible Mineral Supply Chainshttps://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-business-conduct/responsible-mineral-supply-chains.html Traceability must not, however, lead to abandoning regions considered difficult. A sudden withdrawal by responsible buyers can deepen poverty and leave room for more opaque channels. The priority is to improve practices, worker safety and the formalisation of activities.

The risk of wealth without development

For producing countries, mineral abundance can be an opportunity for development, but also a source of dependency. Exporting raw material generally yields less than producing refined metals, components or finished products. Africa supplies around 12% of global mineral exports, but captures only 4% of the value created in green industrial value chains. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, SDG Pulse 2025https://unctad.org/publication/sdg-pulse-2025 Local processing can create skilled jobs and increase public revenue. However, it requires reliable electricity, transport infrastructure, technical skills, a stable tax framework and market access. Without these conditions, processing requirements can discourage investment without delivering the expected industrialisation. The quality of partnerships therefore becomes essential. Contracts should include training, technology transfer, revenue transparency, environmental protection and participation by local communities.

Building resilience without seeking self-sufficiency

The answer is not to produce everything within a single territory. Such an ambition would be costly and often unrealistic. Resilience instead rests on diversifying suppliers, developing multiple refining capacities and building stocks of the most sensitive resources. For 2030, the European Union has set targets of meeting at least 10% of its needs through European extraction, 40% through processing and 25% through recycling. It also seeks to ensure that no external country supplies more than 65% of the annual consumption of a strategic material at any decisive stage of its processing. European Commission, Critical Raw Materials Acthttps://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan/european-critical-raw-materials-act_en Recycling is part of the solution, but it cannot immediately meet all demand. Current products can be difficult to dismantle, and the volumes available at end of life remain insufficient. Action is therefore needed simultaneously on product design, material recovery, substitution and reducing non-essential uses.

A question of responsible sovereignty

Critical natural resources confront societies with a dual responsibility. They must secure the materials needed for modern technologies while avoiding security founded on environmental degradation or the exploitation of vulnerable populations. True mineral sovereignty does not mean possessing every resource. It means understanding dependencies, having alternatives and retaining the capacity to act in a crisis. It also requires sharing more value with producing countries. Minerals are therefore more than an industrial issue. They reveal the weaknesses of the global economic model and raise a central question: how can access to resources be organised without turning the energy and digital transition into a new predatory competition for the planet’s underground wealth?

Conclusion

The issues highlighted by the METRICS congress show that risks associated with natural resources extend far beyond geology alone. Control of minerals also depends on refining, infrastructure, industrial skills, trade routes and the political stability of producing regions. An abundant resource can thus become inaccessible, while a country without deposits can hold a dominant position through its processing capabilities.

Faced with these vulnerabilities, the answer cannot be limited to opening new mines. It must combine supplier diversification, recycling, innovation, traceability and balanced partnerships with producing countries. The METRICS congress thus recalls an often-forgotten truth: the digital and ecological transition will only be sustainable if it rests on responsible resource management, fairer sharing of value and genuine anticipation of strategic dependencies.