Air bases depend on positioning and precise time for navigation, communications, networks, logistics and drones. Jamming, spoofing and natural disruption must therefore be addressed before they occur. Organisations need to identify exposed functions, forecast degradation and prepare decisions that protect flight safety and mission continuity.

Anticipation before disruption

Anticipation begins with a map of direct and indirect GNSS dependencies. It should reveal possible cascading effects. A loss of synchronisation can affect communications, surveillance or operational coordination while navigation receivers still appear to work.

The dependency map should connect to a threat and scenario library. It should cover intentional jamming, gradual spoofing, signal replay, accidental emissions, receiver faults, data errors, ionospheric disturbance and attacks on time distribution networks. Exercises can then test clock holdover, inertial drift, the availability of conventional aids and the ability of teams to recognise doubtful information.

The economic cost confirms the scale of the risk. A study commissioned by the United Kingdom government estimates that a national seven day outage would cost 7.64 billion pounds, including 1.42 billion pounds during the first twenty four hours [5]. Emergency services, maritime activity and road transport would account for most losses. For an air base, the same logic requires operational consequences to be measured before the incident, rather than after service has been lost.

Forecasting for decisions

Forecasting does not mean predicting the next attack with certainty. It produces plausible scenarios, confidence levels and decision thresholds. A base should understand its normal radio environment, then monitor changes in power, frequency, timing coherence and position. Combining this evidence with aircraft reports, spectrum sensors, aviation notices, space weather data and regional observations helps estimate the affected area, likely duration and threatened functions.

These estimates should trigger measures defined in advance. An initial level may increase monitoring. A higher level may quarantine doubtful GNSS data, impose an independent time source, retain conventional navigation aids or change flying activity. The United Kingdom is developing a national detection and warning capability, while the United States federal strategy recommends adaptive antennas, signal processing, sensor fusion and complementary sources [6].

From local detection to international governance

Local detection provides the observations needed for this forecast. In France, the delivery of fifteen KJLab devices by CeRGEN to French air bases is one example among many. According to the DGA, the system was developed in four months to detect jamming and spoofing across GPS, Galileo, BeiDou and GLONASS, retain data and support operational feedback [1]. Its main value lies in its potential connection with other sensors, analysis centres and shared procedures.

The same approach appears in airport monitoring networks, jammer localisation projects and programmes that use telecommunications infrastructure as a sensor network. EASA and IATA are calling for harmonised reporting, rapid warnings and better civil military coordination [2]. ICAO is developing a global roadmap, while ITU, ICAO and IMO have urged states to protect frequencies and locate harmful sources [3] [4].

A systemic and international risk

A local interference event can have consequences far beyond the emission area. Aircraft carry position or timing errors into other systems, networks distribute compromised references and diversions change activity across several regions. Events observed in eastern Europe, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Middle East and the Arctic show that administrative borders do not match radio coverage. Governance must therefore connect defence, civil aviation, network operators, spectrum authorities, industry and research.

The risk management cycle

  1. Anticipation. Map dependencies, build scenarios, test suppliers and train teams.
  2. Forecasting. Fuse alerts, estimate extent, duration and effects, then activate decision thresholds.
  3. Crisis management. Switch to trusted sources, quarantine doubtful data and protect flight safety.
  4. Post crisis. Preserve raw signals, reconstruct the timeline, measure cascading effects and correct procedures.

Layered technical resilience

No single technology is sufficient. Resilience combines adaptive antennas, filters, detection, authentication, inertial navigation and holdover clocks. Galileo OSNMA verifies the origin of navigation data, but does not by itself prevent jamming or every replay method [9]. Independent sources include telecommunications, low Earth orbit signals, vision, terrain, magnetic fields, DME, maritime R Mode and enhanced Loran.

NAVISP illustrates this convergence. NG NAPA combined GNSS, Iridium, 5G, LTE and network processing [7]. GUIDE GNSS brings together Geotrust, FDC, ACTIA and Gustave Eiffel University to assess and certify jamming and spoofing mitigation [8]. Certification turns a resilience claim into measurable performance.

Industrial actors and comparable centres

Thales is investing in TopStar M and TopShield [18]. Safran combines inertial navigation, a secure receiver and an atomic clock in BlackNaute [19]. BAE Systems and Collins Aerospace develop beamforming and adaptive antennas [20] [21]. Honeywell fuses vision, magnetic field, radar, celestial observations and low Earth orbit signals [22]. Hexagon, Septentrio, Spirent, Leonardo, GMV and Telespazio complete the ecosystem.

The United Kingdom Dstl, the United States DEVCOM C5ISR Center, the German DLR and the Swedish FOI are close peers to CeRGEN [14] [15] [16] [17]. They connect public expertise, trials and users. NAVISP, EUSPA, the European Defence Agency, NATO, ICAO and the International Committee on GNSS provide coordination, standards or funding.

Universities and scientific evidence

The University of Texas at Austin and Mark Psiaki developed a reference matrix between attacks and defences [10]. Stanford studies authentication, integrity and interference localisation [11]. At Edwards Air Force Base, the Ohio State University ASPIN Laboratory reduced mean error from 238 metres to 32 metres with cellular signal navigation during intense jamming [12].

The University of Edinburgh studies radio fingerprints and adaptive antennas with Spirent [13]. Gustave Eiffel University works on certification, RWTH Aachen and DLR on antennas, and the University of Greifswald on maritime R Mode. Test quality matters as much as sensor selection.

Business cases and post crisis learning

After hostile jamming severely constrained a Schiebel CAMCOPTER S100 in 2015, the company integrated Hexagon GAJT protection and rapidly returned the aircraft to the mission [23]. Technology surveillance, a ready interface and supplier support accelerated the response. Post crisis analysis should change equipment, contracts and exercises.

Retained data helps distinguish attack, fault and natural disturbance. It supports reconstruction of error propagation, review of decisions and improvement of alert thresholds. Useful lessons can then be shared without exposing sensitive information.

Prospects and decision

Low Earth orbit navigation, compact clocks, quantum sensors, magnetic navigation and distributed detection will advance. They will reduce some dependencies while creating new data and certification needs. Artificial intelligence must remain explainable and controlled for critical functions.

The priority is to connect anticipation, forecasting, detection, continuity and learning. Organisations should measure time gained, confidence in remaining data, mission continuity and the speed at which lessons become capabilities.

Selected sources

1 DGA Livraison de quinze dispositifs KJLab par le CeRGEN octobre 2026 https://fr.linkedin.com/posts/direction-generale-de-larmement_livraison-dgami-dgami-activity-7520898256638218242-_jHk

2 IATA et EASA Plan de réduction des risques liés aux interférences GNSS 18 juin 2025 https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/2025-releases/2025-06-18-01/

3 OACI Rapport mondial sur la sécurité édition 2025 https://www.icao.int/sites/default/files/sp-files/safety/Documents/ICAO_SR_2025.pdf

4 OMI OACI UIT Protection de la navigation par satellite contre les interférences 25 mars 2025 https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/joint-imo-icao-itu-statement-satellite-interference.aspx

5 UK Space Agency Impact économique au Royaume Uni d’une interruption GNSS 2023 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-the-economic-impact-on-the-uk-of-a-disruption-to-gnss

6 US Department of Transportation Positioning Navigation and Timing Strategic Plan 2024 https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2025-01/Positioning%20Navigation%20and%20Timing%20Strategic%20Plan_v%20FINAL.pdf

7 ESA NAVISP Next Generation Network Assisted PNT Assurance 2025 https://navisp.esa.int/news/article/navisp-el1-040-next-generation-network-assisted-pnt-assurance

8 ESA NAVISP GUIDE GNSS certification project 2024 https://navisp.esa.int/project/177-certify-the-level-of-detection-and-mitigation-of-positioning-systems-against-jamming-and-spoofing

9 EUSPA Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication 2025 https://www.euspa.europa.eu/galileo-osnma

10 Psiaki et Humphreys GNSS Spoofing and Detection Proceedings of the IEEE 2016 https://radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/images/stories/files/papers/gnss_spoofing_detection.pdf

11 Stanford GPS Laboratory Research on cyber safety and alternative PNT https://gps.stanford.edu/research/

12 Ohio State University ASPIN Laboratory Navigation through signals of opportunity 2022 https://ece.osu.edu/news/2022/09/ieee-features-aspin-lab-navigation-research-gps-denied-environments

13 University of Edinburgh Secure and resilient PNT receiver research 2026 https://eng.ed.ac.uk/spads-cdt/studying/degrees/postgraduate-research/phd/secure-and-spoofingjamming-resilient-pnt

14 Dstl Defence science capability for positioning navigation and timing https://www.gov.uk/guidance/sensing-defence-science-and-technology-capability

15 US Army DEVCOM C5ISR Center Positioning Navigation and Timing Laboratory https://www.t2.army.mil/T2-Laboratories/Designated-Laboratories/DEVCOM-Command-Control-Communications-Computers-Cyber-Intelligence-Surveillance-and-Reconnaissance-Center/

16 FOI Military PNT Systems survey 2023 https://www.foi.se/en/foi/reports/report-summary.html?reportNo=FOI-R--5559--SE

17 DLR et RWTH Aachen Detection of GNSS interference for maritime applications 2018 https://elib.dlr.de/127019/1/E2_PerezMarcos_Emilio_final.pdf

18 Thales Investment in resilient navigation production 12 juin 2025 https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/print/pdf/node/6166

19 Safran BlackNaute resilient PNT system 17 juin 2025 https://www.safran-group.com/pressroom/blacknaute-resilient-pnt-revolution-against-threats-global-navigation-satellite-systems-gnss-2025-06-16

20 BAE Systems DIGAR adaptive GPS protection 2025 https://www.baesystems.com/en-sa/product/digar

21 Collins Aerospace Compact assured PNT demonstration 22 décembre 2025 https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/2025/12/22/rtxs-collins-aerospace-demonstrates-latest-development-in-anti-jam-technology

22 Honeywell Aerospace Celestial and alternative navigation architecture https://aerospace.honeywell.com/us/en/products-and-services/products/navigation-and-sensors/navigation-systems/celestial-aided-navigation

23 Hexagon Schiebel CAMCOPTER operational case https://hexagon.com/resources/customer-success-stories/anti-jam-technology-allows-schiebel-aircraft-to-get-back-to-critical-missions

24 Septentrio Advanced Interference Monitoring and Mitigation https://www.septentrio.com/en/learn-more/advanced-positioning-technology/gps-gnss-interference

25 Spirent PNT X testing for navigation warfare https://www.spirent.com/events/joint-navigation-conference